An Israeli artillery unit soldier carries an explosive shell near the border with Lebanon on January 11, 2024 in Northern Israel, Israel. The war between Israel and Hamas that ignited on Oct. 7 has also inflamed tensions on the country’s northern border with Lebanon, where the militant political group Hezbollah has traded cross-border fire with Israel in the most significant clashes since 2006. (Photo by Amir Levy/Getty Images)

The War Reserve Stockpile for Allies (WRSA) program is whereby the services procure or retain in their inventories those minimum stockpiles of materiel such as munitions, equipment, and combat essential consumables to ensure support for selected allied forces in time of war until future in-country production and external resupply can meet the estimated combat consumption. Authorized under Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2321h), the law specifies that although these large stockpiles are stored by another nation’s domestic depots, they remain under the ownership and accountability of the United States. In the event of hostilities, the law permits the President to rapidly transfer these assets to the host nation via expedited Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels or emergency drawdowns, bypassing shipping delays to instantly reinforce an allied or other foreign country’s immediate sustainment capacity.

WRSA Program

The WRSA program is primarily utilized in strategic, high-risk theaters where a partner nation may face an immediate, high-intensity conventional threat. Historically, the largest and most complex application of the program was on the Korean Peninsula through WRSA-Korea (WRSA-K). Under this framework, hundreds of thousands of short tons of conventional munitions were forward-prepositioned and integrated into the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army ammunition depots. Although the United States and South Korea signed a termination agreement, the WRSA-K termination agreement, signed and enacted in late 2008, officially concluded the program that stockpiled ammunition in the Korean Peninsula. Resulting in Korea buying back much of the serviceable US stock and the US retrograding or demilitarizing the rest, the legacy of this massive logistics footprint heavily shaped the bilateral defense posture in Korea.

The current use of WRSA is the War Reserve Stock for Allies–Israel (WRSA-I) program, which maintains US-owned munitions in Israel for use by the DoD and its allies during emergencies. Which comprises U.S. munitions, such as missiles and bombs. Since establishing the program in Israel in 1989, Israel has requested access to the WRSA-I inventory on multiple occasions. Army Sustainment Command is the logistics component of the Army Materiel Command and is responsible for the accountability of all Army and Marine Corps munitions in the WRSA-I inventory, from receipt through issuance, transfer, or demilitarization. The ASC uses the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) as the accountable property system of record for munitions.

WRSA Drawdowns

The War Reserve Stockpile for Allies (WRSA) program has been explicitly pulled and issued to a host nation during major regional conflicts, most notably to support Israel (WRSA-I). Since 1989, the several instances in which Israel has accessed the stockpile by authorized emergency drawdowns of these U.S.-owned munitions:

1. During the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel requested that the United States expedite the delivery of precision-guided munitions to Israel.

2. Operation Protective Edge in July 2014, during Israeli military operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

3. In n December 2023, Congress was notified of proposed sales to Israel of tank cartridges and artillery shells. In both instances, the Administration said it was invoking codified emergency authorities. According to the Defense Department, both sales came from WRSA-I.

While WRSA-Korea (WRSA-K) was never activated for emergency combat use, its stocks were systematically transferred to the Republic of Korea through a structural buyback finalized following the program’s formal legislative termination.

Conclusion

The fundamental difference between War Reserve Stockpile Allies (WRSA) and Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) lies in the intended end user and the legal authority that defines who the stock is meant to sustain. WRSA is a strategic, diplomatic program authorized under Title 22 (Foreign Assistance Act) that forward-prepositions serving as an emergency insurance policy to be rapidly transferred to a foreign partner during a crisis.

Distinctly, APS is a program governed by Title 10 (Armed Forces) that positions entire combat equipment sets and associated ammunition globally, allowing US forces to rapidly fly into theater and draw combat-ready equipment, bypassing weeks of strategic sealift. While APS also includes War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA). Defense Department does calculate WRSA requirements alongside Pre-positioned war reserve materiel (PWRM) requirements in joint scenario planning.

While these programs traditionally operated in their own silos, modern large-scale conflicts have blurred those lines, forcing the US to tap into both reservoirs to meet urgent theater sustainment needs.

References

Audit of the DoD’s Accountability Controls over War Reserve Stock for Allies-Israel Inventory, Aug. 7, 2025, https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/4271157/audit-of-the-dods-accountability-controls-over-war-reserve-stock-for-allies-isr/

Audit of the Army’s Management of Army Prepositioned Stock–5 Equipment (Report No. DODIG-2024-083), May 24, 2024, https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3789478/audit-of-the-armys-management-of-army-prepositioned-stock5-equipment-report-no/

Defense Primer: Department of Defense Pre-Positioned Materiel, 12/12/2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11699

David Schenker, Aug 14, 2014, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Best Friends Don’t Have to Ask, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/best-friends-dont-have-ask

John Ramming Chappell and Sarah Harrison, January 16, 2024, Just Security, The “War Reserve Stockpile Allies – Israel” Explained & Why Congress Should Not Expand It, https://www.justsecurity.org/91213/the-war-reserve-stockpile-allies-israel-explained-why-congress-should-not-expand-it/

U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023, 05/28/2025, Congressional Research Service (CRS), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33222

U.S. Army Soldier assigned to 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment “Battle,” 3rd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, engages targets while qualifying with the M7 Next Generation Squad Weapon during a live-fire range at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, Feb. 5, 2026. The qualification demonstrates the unit’s transition to the Army’s newest service rifle, enhancing lethality and accuracy on the modern battlefield. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Austin Paredes)

The Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) methodology is outlined in Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training. The published STRAC strategies provide commanders with the Department of the Army (DA)-approved individual, crew, and collective weapons training strategies and identify the resources required to execute that training. Units use STRAC tables to calculate their baseline training ammunition needs based on their assigned personnel, weapons, and required readiness levels.

As described in AR 5-13, training munitions requirements are derived from the appropriate training strategy table multiplied by the weapons systems or the number of authorized personnel listed on the unit’s approved MTOE/TDA. MTOE (Modified Table of Organization and Equipment) units are deployable, combat-coded forces, while TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances) units are generally non-deployable, administrative, and support organizations.

Three of the most common terms that are thrown around when discussing ammunition training requirements are the following:

STRAC Standard (Minimum). The total types and quantities of munitions required to execute individual qualification and crew certification tasks and a live-fire exercise event (RA) and a field training exercise (RC) each year, as defined in DA Pam 350-38. The standard is the minimum quantity of munitions the Army requires for home-station training for a given year. POI and CTC requirements are additive to the STRAC standard.

STRAC Strategy (Maximum). The total types and quantities of munitions required to execute 100 percent of the Army’s home-station training strategy each year, as defined in DA Pam 350-38. The strategy is the maximum quantity of munitions the Army requires for home-station training for a given year.

Note: Program of Instructions (POI) and Combat Training Centers (CTC) requirements are additive to the STRAC Strategy.

Above STRAC. If a unit requires more ammunition than the baseline STRAC standards allow for specific training events, leadership must manually submit justifications and letters of acceptance to higher headquarters for approval.

The Army Munitions Requirements Council of Colonels (AMRCoC) approves additions, deletions, and modifications to STRAC and POI training strategies. A supporting council of colonels to the Training General Officer Steering Committee (TGOSC) that manages Army training for the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–3/5/7, as explained by Army Regulation 350–1, Army Training and Leader Development.

Ultimately, the STRAC methodology serves as the logistical pillar of Army readiness, ensuring that ammunition requirements are directly tied to data-driven training strategies rather than guesswork. By establishing clear baselines for minimum standards and maximum strategic limits, DA Pam 350-38 enables commanders to forecast resource requirements with greater predictability while maintaining the flexibility to request Above STRAC assets when it is mission essential. Through oversight by councils such as the AMRCoC, the system ensures that as tactics and weapon systems evolve, the Army’s training ammunition resources remain aligned with its capabilities.

References

AR 5-13, Army Munitions Requirements, Prioritization, and Authorizations Management Policy, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1020692

AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1030846

ATS awarded contract in support of Department of Army’s TPO ATSC STRAC Division, https://www.appliedtrg.com/2024/04/04/ats-awarded-contract-in-support-of-department-of-armys-tpo-atsc-strac-division/

A U.S. Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Airman with Detachment 2, 6th Combat Training Squadron, feeds 7.62 mm ammunition into the M240B machine gun during heavy weapons training at Joint Base San Antonio–Camp Bullis, Texas, April 23, 2026. Heavy weapons training is used to ensure operators can quickly load, fire, and clear malfunctions of the weapon under stress, which is essential for maintaining proficiency in handling the weapon, especially for tasks like firing from a bipod. (U.S. Air Force photo by Melissa Hydrick)

Introduction

A critical vulnerability in modern combat operations is the ambiguity over ammunition supply rate calculations. This disconnect between the requirement for integration across all Warfighting Functions to sustain Large-Scale Combat Operations is compounded by the fact that ammunition supply rates affect every Warfighting Function. Including Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The doctrinal home for the ammunition supply rate terms currently resides with Fires. The U.S. Army Field Artillery Branch serves as the proponent for these terms. In the glossary of ATP 3-09.23, Field Artillery Battalion Operations, both RSR and CSR are marked with an asterisk (*), signaling that this publication is the technical authority.¹ This creates a proponent gap because the authority resides in a Fires-centric manual, while the broader Army often views supply rates as a logistics function. The reality is that ammunition supply rates are essential for Warfighting Integration, requiring Operations and Logistics to partner in developing these numbers during planning. Current conflicts worldwide have shown that the commander risks a disconnect between the tactical plan and the ability to sustain operations. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Israel-Hamas War, and, most notably, Operation Epic Fury (Iran War) have shown that ammunition supply has become the foremost factor in achieving strategic objectives.

Ammunition Supply Rates Doctrine

At the center of ammunition doctrine are two important terms, one that sets the commander’s tactical requirements and the other that sets the physical constraints of the theater of operations. These are the Required Supply Rate (RSR) and the Controlled Supply Rate (CSR). Army Techniques Publication 4-35, Munitions Operations, provides definitions of both terms, as follows:

“Required supply rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified period. Controlled supply rate is the rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed in rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day.²”

The most recent ATP 3-09.23, Field Artillery Battalion Operations, dated January 2026, provides the same definitions. While RSR and CSR are logistical outputs, they are driven by the Maneuver and Fires warfighting functions. These definitions appear in various publications and doctrines for other branches, such as Aviation and Engineer Operations. Too often, the ammunition supply rates are treated as a sustainment problem rather than an operational requirement. Munitions are required by more than the Maneuver and Fires warfighting functions, but ammunition supply rates are found primarily in Maneuver, Fires, and Sustainment Doctrine. For commanders, the sustainment warfighting function should not merely respond to the battle; it should actively support it. Ownership of the ammunition supply rate is a multi-tiered effort, not a calculation separate from the tactical mission. A review of Figure 1 shows that, while there is a standard definition, there is a slight difference in interpretation of how they develop and for which purpose.

Figure 1. Ammunition Supply Rate Development (Current).

To interpret contemporary definitions in the context of modern warfare, you need to review their historical background. The evolution of definitions for munition requirements has diverged over a long period of time and is not a new friction point but rather an old one, more likely due to shifting responsibilities between sustainment and combat arms branches that have evolved over decades.

Historical Ogrins

While the Field Artillery Branch currently serves as the proponent for these terms, this was not always the case. One has to go back nearly 70 years to find their origins and what was used in their place. A Field Artillery Tactics manual dating back to 1965 includes a chapter on the Ammunition Service and was intended to provide insight into the service and to promote understanding among combat arms and ammunition service commanders.³ In fact, one of the terms can be traced to its initial appearance in FM 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, 10 January 1955. The fact that the 1955 Ordnance definition of RSR remains identical to the 2026 Field Artillery definition is a testament to its enduring judgment when it was created in the post-World War II decade. This consistency proves that while the technology of warfare has evolved, the fundamental requirement to calculate unrestricted ammunition demand at the tactical level has stood the test of time.

Before altering what has endured this long, the first step toward change is to review the gaps left by what came before as we move into a more technological era of warfare with long-range fires, drones, and artificial intelligence. One of the first definitions that was in ordnance manuals was Ammunition Day of Supply. The 1955 Ordnance field manual defines it as the following:

“Ammunition Day of Supply. The ammunition day of supply is the estimated quantity of ammunition required per day to sustain operations in an active theater. It is expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, and in terms of other units of measure for bulk allotment (antitank mines, hand grenades, demolition explosives, etc.) items.⁴”

If you only consider this part of the definition, you would think that the terms Ammunition Day of Supply and RSR were synonyms. However, the term was used by the Army and theater commanders to establish theater stock levels. It was expressed as either the requirement or the supply level by theater, by base, or by tactical command (army group, army, etc.); with theater army command was of at least 150,000.⁵ The field manual also provided examples of how the term was to be used. The example was “10 days’ supply for the 81-mm mortar; 6 days’ supply for the 105 howitzer; 15 days’ supply for all other weapons.⁶” The term was used for higher echelons and had no application to individual tactical units. The Ammunition Day of Supply was not the only obscure Class V unit of measure that was used in the WWII era.

“Unit of fire.—A unit prescribed for a designated organization or weapon. It is a quantity in rounds or tons of ammunition bombs, grenades, and pyrotechnics which the organization or weapon may be expected to expend on the average in one day of combat. It is used to simplify ammunition computation in planning. The number of rounds per weapon or organization will vary with the types and calibers of weapons.⁷”

A separate publication had to explicitly state that the unit of fire was not synonymous with the term “day of supply”.⁸ The confusion was most likely compounded by the fact that there was another term coined, missions of fire. The separate definition was also due to the Army Air Corps still being part of the U.S. Army before becoming a separate service branch.

“Missions of fire.—The total amount of ammunition of all types required to load a squadron of planes once. For a given type of plane, the total mission for each kind of ammunition is the product of the quantity required to load one plane completely, multiplied by the total number of tactical planes.⁹”

Just as the unit of fire was used for large tactical formations, the missions of fire was used for entire squadrons. The essence of these military terms was deeply rooted in the industrial constraints of the era in which they were developed. During this period, large-scale combat demanded a large volume of munitions, necessitating high-level planning across multiple campaigns on various fronts. Because the Computer Age was nowhere in sight following WWII, every complex logistical calculation had to be drafted by hand. This reliance on manual calculations meant that logistical language had to account not only for top-down planning but also for the tyranny of distance. This can also be seen in the evolution of the controlled supply rate.

The term that most closely resembled that was Available Supply Rate. A definition that made its way into doctrine in the 1955 Ordnance Manuals. Which defined the term as:

“Available Supply Rate. The available supply rate is the rate of consumption of ammunition that can be sustained with available supplies, announced by each commander and applicable within his command. For ammunition items fired from weapons, this rate is expressed in rounds per weapon per day and in terms of other units of measure for bulk allotment items.¹⁰”

The term was established to provide tactical commanders with the essential flexibility required to adapt their units to changing operational plans and evolving mission commitments.¹¹ By providing this framework, it ensured that the commander could effectively communicate to higher headquarters and respond to rapidly shifting tactical conditions on the battlefield with the available munitions on hand.

The ever-evolving terms are not a new problem, and one that has been addressed before by other military officers of the past. In a 1976 thesis to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, MAJ Kelly, Ordnance Officer, developed a methodology that would provide ammunition consumption rate planning factors for planners developing estimated ammunition requirements for operations below theater level.¹² In his analysis, he also reviews these terms, but was able to go back to 1917 to find another term, Day of Fire. Which, from what he found, was “The day of fire was a theoretical quantity of ammunition, normally expressed in rounds, expected to be consumed during a day of combat operations.¹³” Adding another layer of evolving doctrine. Ultimately, the terminology has reflected a strategic shift toward agility, allowing unit commanders below the brigade to synchronize their actions with the broader mission.

Figure 2. Ammunition Planning Factors (Historical to Current).

By institutionalizing these changes over the years, the Army has sought to balance winning battles with the unpredictable nature of combat. The required supply rate and available supply rate were introduced in the 1950s alongside the already used day of supply, which continued to be the planning factor for theater planning. This comes from Department of the Army documents that contain ammunition consumption rates for planning purposes, such as FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers’ Field Manual, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Planning Factors, and Supply Bulletin (SB) 38-26, Logistics Management: Non-nuclear Ammunition Supply Rates, as seen in figure 3. The legacy of the former Staff Officers’ Field Manual endures in ATP 5-0.2-1, Staff Reference Guide Volume I, yet it offers only a narrow view of the estimated daily Class V consumption rates for modern Brigade Combat Teams. This doctrinal gap is further compounded by the fact that the primary supply bulletin on ammunition supply rates has long been abandoned and has not been updated since 1979.¹⁴ This inactivity likely stems from the onset of the Computer Age, which shifted the Army’s focus away from standardized tables toward digitized logistics modeling.

Figure 3. Ammunition Consumption Rate versus Strength of Force (1976).

By the 1980s, an office in Headquarters, Department of the Army, formerly known as the Operations Readiness and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO–OD), had the responsibility to assess the Ammunition System to support operations and contingency planning; DAMO–OD provided current tactics, doctrine, and concepts and submit the data for combat computer simulations; and maintained major commands (MACOM) required supply rates and basic load requirements.¹⁵ Changes over the years were driven by many factors, including technological advances and the overall complexity of planning and supplying combat operations. Shift necessitated moving away from manual methods, as the sheer volume of data involved in modern planning began to outpace individual capability. With the advent of computers, a solution was found to automate ammunition planning.

As the modern army shifts its focus back to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), the core requirement for enormous quantities of munitions remains as vital now as it was during WWII. Modern commanders are tasked with navigating a sophisticated digital landscape, yet they still struggle to identify ammunition requirements, just as their predecessors who led these very units did 80 years ago. Ultimately, Army planners find themselves looking backward to large-scale endurance while simultaneously looking forward to digital systems. These changes represent a fundamental shift to an era where logistical precision has become just as critical to victory as predicted firepower.

Multi-Domain Large-Scale Combat Operations

In the last few years, the world has seen the end of decades-long counterinsurgency operations and the rise of major combat operations. The transition back to large-scale warfare is evident in the ongoing trench warfare in Ukraine, the urban combat operations of the Israel-Hamas War, and the unprecedented air campaign seen during Operation Epic Fury. These current operations have made it obvious that existing ammunition planning factors are wholly inadequate for predicting actual consumption, let alone sustaining joint and multinational forces through a prolonged conflict. The intensity of these wars outpaces established doctrinal estimates, leaving a gap between planned stockpiles and battlefield expenditures.

Required Supply Rate (RSR)

The volatile consumption of munitions in high-tempo, multi-domain engagements has created non-linear spikes in demand that current straight-line data outputs cannot account for in automated planning. Ammunition supply can no longer be taken for granted to be always available. Dr. Thomas E. Ward II, in 2009, most eloquently stated, “The tactician must understand why he needs to express the needed ammunition in the RSR in order to accomplish his mission, and the logistician needs to understand how much the tactician needs in order to ensure that requirements do not exceed capabilities.¹⁶” One of the most important tools that is provided for RSR is the manual method for computing an RSR for artillery ammunition, which is provided by the field artillery branch. Found in ATP 3-09.23, Field Artillery Battalion Operations, and is the publication authority for the term. But field artillery is just one of many branches within the many Warfighting Functions. Additionally, this manual method is for the lowest echelon to conduct ammunition requirement planning.

To plan requirements at the high echelons, planners need automated tools, such as those in Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management, with the primary tool being the Operational Logistics (OPLOG) Planner. This tool features an intuitive interface and a logical, step-by-step workflow that enables logistics planners to quickly and precisely generate estimated requirements.¹⁷ Ultimately, the tool transforms a traditionally cumbersome task into a seamless digital experience, bridging the gap between raw data and actionable logistics intelligence. The purpose is to assist logistics planners in estimating requirements in support of operations associated with multiphase operational plans and operational orders.¹⁸ Automated Class V Ammunition Planning Factors are considered equipment-based logistics planning factors. These are a variable set of factors based on the operation and phase. Figure 4 provides detailed information on the automated planning factors, including components, factors, and the data output.

Figure 4. Class V: Ammunition Planning Factors (Automated)

While ammunition planning factors have moved into the digital age with tools such as the OPLOG planner, the system focuses on supporting higher echelons in campaign planning. Planners at the brigade level and below might find that using the OPLOG planner is challenging to achieve the level of detail required to maintain accurate forecasts.¹⁹ As previously noted, the disparity persists between the consumption rates of individual weapon systems and the aggregate ammunition requirements for theater planning. Unfortunately, modern automated tools continue to generate the same inconsistent computations. However, this is inherent to military planning at large, as granular precision is inevitably sacrificed for high-level strategic modeling. While these generalized rates are necessary for theater-level planning, they often fail to capture the specific requirements of executing frontline units. If creating ammunition requirements is difficult, the problem is compounded by the need to control a limited supply of ammunition.

Controlled Supply Rate

The controlled supply rate was initially the available supply rate (ASR). It was not used as a controlling mechanism, but rather a rate of consumption, stated by commanders for their command, of ammunition that can be sustained with available supplies. If the RSR was how much commanders needed, then the ASR functioned as a consumption rate based on existing stocks, allowing commanders to understand the limits of their available resources. While the controlled supply rate is based on ammunition consumption, it has shifted to what can be supported. When considering availability, facilities, and transportation, complex equations cannot be readily formulated. The level of detail required are those which can be provided by the U.S. Army Transportation Command’s Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) Deployability Studies, Infrastructure, and Seaport/Port Assessments.²⁰ This is an organization with engineers that provide modeling & simulation and far more resources than any ordnance officer has available.

The closest to step-by-step instructions the Army provided for creating controlled supply rates comes from an MM4632A-Compute Authorized Levels of Ammunition. This was a specialized training module within the United States Army munitions management curriculum that trained personnel to determine, calculate, and validate authorized ammunition stock levels for unit operations. One subsection, titled computing controlled supply rate, provides a detailed example.

“The Situation. The following exists in an active theater for 105mm ammunition. Using the formula, determine if a CSR is necessary and, if so, what the CSR would be.

• S/O = 100,000 rounds at 60 DOS.

• S/L = 50,000 rounds at 30 DOS.

• O/H = 92,000 rounds

Consumption for the next 30 days, based on RSRs submitted, is 52,000 rounds.

Weapons Density = 160

On the 27th day, 45,000 rounds will be received from CONUS.

We determine the amount to be 45,182.

The correct amount is figured like this:

• 52,000 rounds ¸ 30 days = 1,734 rounds (one day consumption)

• 1,734 rounds x 27 days = 46,818 rounds (expended in 27 days)

• 92,000 rounds - 46,818 rounds = 45,182 (On hand on 27th Day)²¹”

1. Determine the Deficit: 50,000 - 45,182 = 4,818 rounds (Shortage)

2. Determine if a CSR is necessary: Yes. Because the projected on-hand balance falls below the established Safety Level before the resupply arrives, a CSR must be implemented to restrict consumption and preserve the S/L.

3. Calculate the CSR: To find the CSR, we must calculate how many rounds can be fired per weapon, per day, without going below the 50,000-round Safety Level over the 27 days.

4. 92,000 (O/H) - 50,000 (S/L) = 42,000 rounds.

5. 42,000 ¸ 27 days = 1,555.55 rounds per day

6. 1,556 ¸ 160 weapons = 9.7 CSR per Weapon. ²²

While the situation was incomplete, generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) was able to fill in the missing portion of the problem identified as 1 through 6. The original source has long since been lost to historical updates, and the formula in Figure 5 was developed through previous professional military education. To ensure that the information in the situation above does reflect an accurate formula to compute a controlled supply rate.

Figure 5. Controlled Supply Rate (CSR) Formula.

There are several drawbacks to using the controlled supply rate as described in the training material. Primary among these is the requirement for ammunition managers to establish a Safety Level (S/L). This is a predetermined quantity of ammunition, typically calculated as Days of Supply (DOS), representing a specific percentage of the overall stockage objective based on the order and shipping time from the National Inventory Control Point (NICP), and serves as the critical floor.²³ Calculating a Safety Level would be just as complex as determining the CSR for any given transportation limitations. A secondary problem is that this formula only works for known shipments of munitions. That is to say, the example provides a solution to the problem of extending ammunition supplies until a shipment can replenish stocks. A controlled supply rate does not account for facilities and transportation constraints. A shipment arrives, but ports and vessels can only do so much in a given time, and transportation assets are limited and can only move a limited amount of munitions to the end user. These are variables that the CSR formula cannot calculate for, and most likely the reason it was abandoned over the years during doctrine updates.

As the Army pivots back to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), the most feasible solution would be to create tables for brigades and below, such as those in the former Staff Officers’ Field Manual, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Planning Factors, and Supply Bulletin (SB) for Ammunition Supply Rates. But as the Army, an ever-evolving organization, transitions from the Brigade Modular Force back to the Division as the Unit of Action, it cannot simply replicate past models. Our Army must take what was learned and apply the vast technological advances in computing power and the AI era to improve ammunition supply rate planning, while taking a pragmatic approach to the problem.

Recommendations

With the Total Munitions Requirements (TMR) process (along with subsidiary processes), the Army as a whole can identify munitions types and quantities to meet war reserve, operational, training, and test requirements. In conjunction with Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), and Direct Reporting Units (DRU), munitions can be identified for the whole service and entire theaters. Total Munitions Requirements is used to inform readiness assessments and identify long-term investment requirements for munitions.²⁴ The TMR can be enhanced from the bottom up by providing commanders with the tools to create the required supply rates and enabling ammunition planners to communicate the limitations with controlled supply rates.

Most importantly, an automated munitions planner that both the tactician can use to express the needed ammunition in RSR to accomplish the mission in support of higher headquarters and the munitions officer to ensure that requirements do not exceed the capabilities of the Army ammunition enterprise. While tools like the OPLOG planner have their place in campaign planning. The current operational environment requires identifying the gap between RSR and CSR relative to a near-peer enemy, which can lead to early mission failure. The sustainment warfighting function must enable freedom of action by balancing CSR controls with the need for decentralized, semi-independent operations. Tools that can assist G-4 planners and can be imbedded with user-created applications within the suite of available tools. An automated munitions planner that can utilize advanced AI capabilities from the recent War Department agreements with eight of the world’s leading AI companies, SpaceX, OpenAI, Google, NVIDIA, Reflection, Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Oracle.²⁵ Before a munitions planner can be created, some steps can be taken internally to the Army to support commanders and their staff before looking outward for solutions.

Required Supply Rate Calculation

Even though Field Artillery functionally controls the term RSR, every branch that uses munitions must be able to estimate the amount of ammunition required for an operation. Each Army Center of Excellence must ensure that each proponent under it that uses munitions creates a manual method for computing an RSR. Not as a micromanagement tool, but a functional aid to assist units that do not have the combat experience to create these estimates from nothing. Additionally every branch should provide a method for phased forecasting. Some organizations may only have to base their planning on the overall operation. Others would need to project RSR by operational phase, which is critical to prevent mid-mission culmination and ensure that resources are available when most needed. Along with data-driven requirements, this includes moving from best-guess estimates based on weapon densities to databases that provide historical and real-time snapshots of munition combat expenditures for similar operations. Drawing on experience gained in current combat operations and using data-driven predictive logistics to anticipate increases in RSR before they happen.

Controlled Supply Rate Calculation

In contested logistics, the enemy targets logistics nodes and distribution networks with the same intensity as maneuver units, meaning a CSR can change due to stockpile attrition and reduced capabilities. Tools that provide scenario-based CSR modeling should be easy to adjust and planning must account for dispersed nodes. Large supply ports should be broken into smaller nodes to improve CSR survivability, while enabling instant modeling of these out and providing the end user with their portion of available supplies. To win in LSCO, commanders and their staff must shift from reactive ammunition supply rates to dynamic, predictive forecasting that can be shared throughout supported units. This requires integrating these tools into the Intelligence Warfighting Function to account for enemy stockpiles and into Mission Command to identify the Controlled Supply Rate at the tactical formation level, accounting not only for logistics limitations but also for the priority of effort in combat forces.

Conclusion

There is an unequivocal interrelationship between ammunition and tactics applied by commanders. Tactical plans and ammunition are inseparable. The class V commodity directly impacts operations at the tactical, operational, theater strategic and national strategic levels of warfare. As a result of this fundamental fact, tactical commanders must plan their operations with a full understanding of what the ammunition enterprise can provide to meet their intent. Reciprocally, sustainment commanders must establish stockage objectives to support operational and theater strategic plans. Future success depends on moving from managing the ammunition shortage to providing combat endurance. In Large-Scale Combat Operations, the application of combat power wins each battle, but the synchronization of RSR and CSR will win the war and meet the national strategy.

Notes

Epigraph. General Fred C. Weyand, US Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., US Army, Serving the People The Need for Military Power, Military Review 75th Anniversary, 1922-1997.

¹ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3-09.23, Field Artillery Battalion Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 31 January 2023), 145.

² Headquarters, Department of The Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 4-35, Munitions Operations, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 25 February 2026), 2-15.

³ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 6-20-1, Field Artillery Tactics, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 July 1965), 52.

⁴ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 January 1955), 35.

⁵ Army, FM 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, 1955, 36.

⁶ Army, FM 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, 1955, 36.

⁷ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 9-6, Ammunition Supply, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 29 July 1942), 3.

⁸ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 July 1942), 20.

⁹ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 9-6, Ammunition Supply, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 29 July 1942), 5.

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 January 1955), 36.

¹¹ Army, FM 9-5, Ordnance Service In The Field, 1955, 37.

¹² Edward M. Kelley, A Methodology for Predicting Ammunition Requirements as a Function of Force Size (Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 1976), 6.

¹³ Kelley, Predicting Ammunition Requirements, 14.

¹⁴ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Field Manual No. 4-30.13, Ammunition Handbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Munitions Handlers, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 March 2001), Bibliography-4.

¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 700 – 8, The Army Ammunition Management System, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 December 1982), 11.

¹⁶ Dr. Thomas E. Ward II, RSR and CSR: Why the Confusion? Army Logistician. Volume 41, Issue 2 (March-April 2009), 16.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Army Regulation 700 – 8, Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 21 July 2021), 4.

¹⁸ Army, AR 700-8, Logistics Planning Factors and Data Management, 2021, 4.

¹⁹ Sarah A. Barron, The Trouble with LOGSTATs, Armor, Fall 2024 Edition (October 1, 2024), 4.

²⁰ U.S. Army Transportation Command, “Welcome to the Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA),” Accessed 4 May 2026, https://www.army.mil/artrans#org-tea

²¹ “Computing Controlled Supply Rate,” Accessed 4 May 2026, http://armymunitions.tpub.com/MM4632A/MM4632A0020.htm

²² Added 1 to 6. Response to “Complete the missing steps for the munitions logistics problem,” Gemini, Google, May 4, 2026, https://gemini.google.com/.

²³ “Computing Controlled Supply Rate,” Accessed 4 May 2026, http://armymunitions.tpub.com/MM4632A/MM4632A0020.htm

²⁴ Headquarters, Department of The Army, Department of the Army Regulation 5 – 13, Army Munitions Requirements, Prioritization, and Authorizations Management Policy , (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 31 March 2021), 7.

²⁵ “Classified Networks AI Agreements,” Accessed 4 May 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4475177/classified-networks-ai-agreements/

Requesting Munitions

To draw ammunition, units must submit a standard DA Form 581 generated through the Total Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS) by the supporting ammunition support activity (ASA). In accordance with Army Policies, each unit must have a valid DA Form 1687 (Delegation of Authority – Receipt for Supplies) on hand at the supporting ASA. Accordingly, units must properly assign and maintain the users listed on the DA Form 1687 as the “requestor” and “approver” in TAMIS.

Figure 1. DA Form 1687 (DoDAAC Boxed in Red)

But what exactly is the Ammo Supply Point validating, and how?

Units must use the DoDAAC approved for the UIC listed in TAMIS. Failure to use the approved DoDAAC will result in the TAMIS-generated DA Form 581 being rejected by the ammunition supply activity. Army policy requires you to contact the unit DoDAAC manager to validate the correct DoDAAC and UIC alignment.

The unit identification code (UIC) and DoDAAC listed on the delegation authority for ammunition will match the UIC listed on the unit commander’s assumption of command orders and be properly registered with the logistics support activity. Unit ammunition managers will ensure the UIC in TAMIS is properly aligned with the UIC on the delegation authority for ammunition.

Simple Search provides a single-record search in the Department of Defense Activity Address Directory (DoDAAD) to confirm that the Unit Identification Code owns the DoDAAC. However, it does not indicate whether it is the correct DoDAAC for the type of transaction.

Accountability

Property Accountability policies require all class V items to be placed on the organizational property book upon issue from the supporting ammunition support activity. This applies to operational and combat load ammunition.

When issuing training ammunition to users, use DA Form 5515 (Training Ammunition Control Document) as a hand receipt for issuing ammunition in various quantities from a parent unit (battalions) to a subordinate unit (companies). The using unit that receives ammunition from the ASP assigns a document number to DA Form 5515 from the expendable items document register.

In short, operational and combat load ammunition uses property book accountability, and training ammunition uses the unit expendable supplies register.

Where can you find these DoDAACs?

The hint to the answer can be found in a former ammunition publication, DA PAM 710–2–2. The 2024 revision moved stock control procedures, Standard Army Ammunition System Level 4, and manual and automated procedures to DA Pam 700 – 16 (formerly chap 24). The automated system for other classes of supply is the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), which is the U.S. Army’s primary web-based logistics and financial management system. It replaces several legacy systems, including Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced. The system categorizes logistics activities using three-digit numeric codes. Maintenance, property book, tactical SSA, unit supply, installation SSAs, and medical operations are assigned a type unit code (TUC) that restricts which classes of supplies can be ordered by the functional activities. The intent of these restrictions is to enforce supply discipline in an automated fashion. The TUC includes the following:

• 910-Unit Maintenance.

• 915-Aviation Maintenance.

• 920-Property Book. [Property Book Accountability]

• 930-Tactical SSA.

• 940-Medical Operations.

• 950-Unit Supply. [Unit Expendable Supplies]

• 960-Installation Fixed-based SSA.

Logistics personnel can look up or verify a unit’s active TUC in GCSS-Army by executing the system transaction code ZSPTX and reviewing the force element.

Conclusion

One major drawback is that automated systems for Unit Identification Codes (UICs) include all DoDAACs in the Department of Defense Activity Address Directory (DoDAAD), thereby requiring clerks to verify which DoDAAC to use. Ultimately, there is no such thing as a Class V DoDAAC, but certain DoDAACs must be used for specific ammunition transactions to ensure accountability by receiving units.

References

AR 5–13, 31 March 2021

AR 700–28, 9 October 2020

AR 710–4, 15 April 2026

DA PAM 700–16, 23 June 2021

DA PAM 710–2–2, 1 July 2024

Department of Defense Activity Address Directory (DoDAAD) https://www.dla.mil/Defense-Data-Standards/Committees/DODAAD/

Demilitarizing ammunition in support of Operation New Dawn

In the advanced theater of modern warfare, there is a tendency to look forward. Drones, cyberwarfare, and AI-driven logistics have captured the spotlight. However, as global conflicts have shown, “historical doctrine” often becomes the most relevant. When an Ammunition Support Activity (ASA) is at risk of being overrun, the mission shifts from supply to denial. I had to go back 25 years to find the doctrine on what to do if you are going to lose your ammunition supply point to the enemy.

Read the reprint below.

Note: Publications are Inactive.

Emergency Destruct Operations

When faced with the possibility of capture by the enemy, an ASA or ATP may be called upon to conduct ED operations on part or all of its stocks. This chapter discusses the reasons for emergency munitions destruction and provides guidance in aspects of planning and conducting safe operations. Also, it describes methods of destruction and elements of required training.

OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

11-1. Emergency destruction of munitions is conducted for one of two reasons. The first is to prevent enemy use. The second is to prevent disclosure of information about classified munitions. The object of ED is to render munitions inoperable, destroy munitions and documents of value to the enemy, and render what is left too hazardous to use. By reducing the stockpile as much as possible, units ensure that the least amount of munitions is destroyed. Quantities can be reduced in several ways. One is to move as much of the munitions as possible to a safe location. Another is to issue excess amounts to using units.

AUTHORIZATION TO DESTROY

11-2. The authority to destroy munitions must be established in command operating procedures. The applicable OPLAN or SOP must specify who in the chain of command is authorized to order the ED of ASA or ATP stocks. Only divisional or higher level commanders have the authority to order destruction of munitions. The commander may delegate this authority to subordinate commanders when the situation demands. Also, the command may dictate when and how to conduct ASA or ATP ED, including the types of items authorized for destruction and the destruction methods.

11-3. The decision to destroy, the method to be used, and the items to be destroyed all depend on factors involving command policy and the logistical and tactical situation. Some of the more important things to consider include—

• Tactical situation.

• Location of the ASA or ATP.

• Amount of ammunition and the time required to destroy the ASA or ATP.

• Security classification of the munitions.

• Available materiel and trained personnel.

• Safety considerations.

These factors are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Also, added precautions must be taken when depleted uranium munitions or armor must be destroyed (see TB 9-1300-278).

TACTICAL SITUATION

11-4. The current tactical situation provides input to the decision-making process. The various ED methods require different setup and execution times. Also, the different methods provide different possibilities for complete destruction. With more time available, more complete destruction methods can be used. If time allows, the decision to authorize ED must be made at a higher command level. However, the senior person at the ASA or ATP may be required to authorize ED to prevent enemy capture and use.

ASA OR ATP LOCATION

11-5. Where the ASA or ATP is located has a bearing on which method of destruction is used. If an ASA or ATP is near a populated area, demolition may not be practical. On the other hand, if the destroyed ASA or ATP would create an obstacle to oncoming enemy forces, demolition would be useful.

AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION/TIME REQUIRED

11-6. The amount of demolition resources and the time required to destroy an ammunition stockpile are directly related to the amount of ammunition to be destroyed and its degree of dispersion. The quickest ED method is by fire support. An ASA or ATP can be destroyed with an artillery or air attack. ED by burning or demolition requires a lot of preparation time. Burning is faster because demolition requires setting up and priming explosive charges and setting up an initiation system.

11-7. A tradeoff may need to be made. With an artillery strike, the munitions may not all be destroyed. By burning or explosive demolition, the possibility of complete destruction of the ASA or ATP is much greater.

MUNITIONS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

11-8. Classified munitions must be evacuated if at all possible. If not possible, classified munitions will be the first to be destroyed. To ensure complete destruction, classified munitions are destroyed by the most reliable demolition method.

AVAILABLE MATERIEL AND TRAINED PERSONNEL

11-9. If the ASA or ATP has no demolition or flammable materiel, destruction methods are limited. Also, demolition materiel may be more critical for offensive purposes than for ASA or ATP ED. In this case, destruction must be carried out by burning or other available methods. Only personnel trained in ED operations and thoroughly familiar with the unit ED SOP should be permitted to conduct demolition operations.

PLANNING

11-10. Planning for ED must start immediately. It is difficult to establish SOPs because tactical and logistical situations in each combat zone vary. However, the methods of destruction are basic and flexible enough to serve as SOPs in combat emergencies. The ED plan must be either an annex to the unit SOP or a separate SOP. To ensure the plan is complete and feasible, staff it through technically qualified personnel and division, corps, or theater staff elements (i.e., EOD, the safety office, G3, and G4).

11-11. The division, corps, and theater staff agencies must thoroughly prepare for ED. Plans must address destruction priorities and procedures.

11-12. When establishing an ASA or ATP, the DAO and MMCs must plan to push ED materiel to the site. ED materiel requirements can be based on the expected daily push to the ATP (RSR for supported elements) or on the stockage objective for the ASA. To support any increased munitions flow, the MMCs or DAO must ensure that additional ED materiel is pushed to the ASA or ATP. ED materiel should be kept on hand at all times during normal operations, relocations, or evacuations. ASA and ATP personnel must be trained in ED methods and procedures. All personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the unit ED SOP and methods of destruction.

PRIORITIES

11-13. Priorities for ED are based on the tactical situation and the types of munitions stored at the ASA or ATP. ED priorities must be established in OPLANs and SOPs. Priorities may change based on the logistical and tactical situation. Munitions vital to the defense of the unit will not be destroyed. See Table 11-1 below for a suggested priority list for munitions ED.

SAFETY

11-14. Observance of safety precautions is mandatory, regardless of the ED method used or the urgency of the situation. Only trained, experienced personnel may conduct ED procedures. Safety requirements determine the number of personnel engaged in ED operations. Safety considerations include the amount and type of munitions being destroyed and the size of the ASA or ATP. A minimum of two personnel must be present during all operations.

11-15. Tactical situation permitting, coordination with and warning of those units endangered by the ED operation must be accomplished to prevent casualties.

11-16. No matter which ED method is used, special care must be taken when destroying ICM, rockets, missiles, and ejection-type munitions. ICM and ejection-type munitions may expel their payload when detonated or burned. These submunitions must be treated as UXO. Rockets and missiles will be pointed away from friendly troops since they could be set off by accident during the ED process and propelled in the directions they were pointed.

11-17. When using electrical or remote firing devices during ED operations, a minimum distance of 400 meters must be maintained from radio transmitters.

BURNING

11-18. The type and quantity of munitions being burned determines the radius of the danger area around the burning site. A minimum 1,000-meter (0.6-mile) safe area must be established when surrounding units and personnel are warned and under protective cover.

DEMOLITION

11-19. The type and quantity of munitions being destroyed, the fragmentation hazard, and the protective cover provided to personnel in the area determine the radius of the danger area surrounding the destruction of munitions by demolition. The information in Table 11-2 is based on ballistic data and field experience and should be used as a guide. If there is any doubt about an item, the distance will be increased for reasons of safety. Distance may be adjusted based on the tactical situation, terrain, and available protective cover for exposed personnel.

METHODS OF DESTRUCTION

11-20. Choose methods of destruction that cause such damage that the munitions will not be restorable to a usable condition within the combat zone by repair or by cannibalization. Destruction should be planned to impede enemy troop movements without creating hazards to friendly troops.

11-21. The methods for destroying munitions listed below may be used either singly or in combination. The actual method or methods used in a given tactical situation depend on time, personnel, type of munitions, and available means of ED. These methods include firing, concealment, burning, and demolition, and are discussed below.

FIRING/FIRE SUPPORT

11-22. At the using unit, firing the munitions into enemy-held territory is the simplest and most effective way of preventing enemy capture. Another ED method is using fire support. An ASA or ATP can be effectively destroyed if it is shelled or bombed. This method is particularly useful to ensure complete destruction after burning or demolition. Also, it is quite useful as a primary means of ED when there is no time to evacuate or set up any other ED method. An advantage of ED by fire support is that it can be used even after the ATP has been occupied by enemy forces.

CONCEALMENT

11-23. Concealment is the least desirable ED method. It is viable when the lack of time precludes using other methods. If the terrain provides adequate covering, or if bodies of water are available for dumping munitions, concealment may be an excellent ED method. Puncture hermetically sealed metal cans before throwing them into water if time permits. Concealment of components such as fuzes can prevent or at least delay use by the enemy.

BURNING

11-24. Burning is less time-consuming than demolition. However, it is not recommended for all types of munitions because it rarely accomplishes total destruction. When time is a major consideration, burning may be used to destroy boxed munitions. When burning, munitions must be surrounded with combustible/flammable materiel. To guarantee an extremely brisk fire, diesel fuel, gasoline, paint thinner, or other suitable combustible or flammable liquid should be used

Table 11-2. Minimum Safe Evacuation Distance (in Meters) for Demolition Operations

11-25. For maximum destruction, munitions-laden trailers should be pulled close together. Fuel, wood, paper, scrap boxes, propellant charges, or any combustible materiel can be used for burning. Fuel is especially useful. Fuel soaked munitions boxes are excellent for ensuring a fire strong enough to destroy munitions.

11-26. Combustible materiel will be placed under and over the munitions to be destroyed. An initiation train of combustible materiel can be used to ignite the fire; it must be 8 meters (26 feet) in length, long enough to allow soldiers to evacuate to a safe area. If time fuse is used as the initiation train, enough fuse must be used based on the burn rate to permit evacuation to a safe area. See FM 5-250 for more information. An alternate initiation method is to shoot a full fuel can with an incendiary bullet. If it becomes necessary to use gasoline or other highly volatile, flammable liquid, extreme caution must be taken to prevent premature ignition. For greater safety, ignition should be made by electrical means or by a remote-firing device.

DEMOLITION

11-27. The way in which a demolition charge is placed can make the difference between minor damage and complete destruction. For this reason, ED demolition teams must be trained on basic demolition procedures and on all available firing systems (see FM 5-250). Demolition materiel can be saved when planning ED operations by using HE-filled munitions in conjunction with demolition charges.

11-28. ED demolition teams must understand how and where to place demolition charges on different munitions to achieve complete destruction or to make the item unusable by the enemy. Demolition teams must be familiar with the preferred procedures for destruction of munitions in applicable TM 43-0002-series manuals.

11-29. Placements of demolition charges vary for different types of munitions. Also, placement of the charge may be different for items while in shipping and storage configurations versus when they are removed from the containers.

Mutilation. [FM 9-13. 1986]

If there is time, items that are lightly constructed (rocket motors, propelling charge containers, etc.) can be destroyed by unpalletizing them and running vehicles or forklifts over them.

Note: Forklifts and vehicles will not be driven over complete rocket rounds. For example, warheads should be detached from rocket motors before motors are destroyed by mutilation. Remember, no destruction method or methods will completely destroy all the material.

TRAINING

11-30. Rehearsal of responsible personnel in all phases of destruction is mandatory with special emphasis on training in demolition techniques. The training program should also include instruction in selecting sites, blocking communication routes, and impeding enemy movement.

11-31. Demolition explosives afford an effective means of destroying munitions to prevent enemy use. Demolition personnel must be familiar with pertinent provisions of DA Pam 385-64, FM 5-250, TMs 9-1375-200/2 and 9-1375-213-12, and TM 43-0002-series manuals.

11-32. Local EOD units can be contacted to provide technical assistance during hands-on training sessions and to assist in developing ED SOPs. The munitions unit commander must provide training munitions for all hands-on sessions. The STRAC manual provides the munitions allocations for demolitions training.

SUMMARY

11-33. The authority for ED, whether direct or delegated, must be identified in the appropriate OPLAN and SOP. The decision to destroy munitions is based on safety, logistical, and tactical considerations that may have implications beyond what appears to be an imminent enemy threat. ED operations should be considered as an option of last resort and should always receive planning and safety emphasis.

Refrences

Demilitarizing ammunition in support of Operation New Dawn, https://www.army.mil/article/120754/demilitarizing_ammunition_in_support_of_operation_new_dawn

FM 4-30.13, Mar 2001, https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm_4-30.13%2801%29.pdf

FM 9-13, Nov 1986, https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/FM9-13%2886%29minusChapter1.pdf

Figure 1. SAFER Version 3.1 Architecture, Technical Paper (TP) 14, Approved Methods and Algorithms for DOD Risk-Based Explosives Siting.

Quantity-Distance (QD) criteria have served as the main standard for the safe placement of facilities for over 70 years. These criteria only take into account the amount of explosives, Hazard Division (HD), and the type of facility to establish a safe separation distance.

The Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board identified the need for a risk-based method for explosives safety analysis. In 1997, they formed the Risk-Based Explosives Safety Criteria Team (RBESCT) to develop this approach, which led to the creation of the Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk tool.

The general method adopted originated in the 1600s and has been used worldwide in a variety of forms since then. In 1662, the French mathematician Blaise Pascal wrote:

The basic equation is the mathematical foundation for many specific risk equations. These equations are used by SAFER and trace back to this equation:

Risk = Likelihood x Consequences x Exposure

DESR 6055.09 provides guidance and minimum requirements for quantitative risk-based siting. It provides the basis for quantifying risks from a PES to personnel at each exposed site (ES) (individual risk, probability of fatality (P_f )) and at all exposed sites (group risk, expected fatalities (E_f)) by performing a quantitative risk assessment when the QD criteria of this manual cannot be met. Procedures are provided for preparing, submitting, and periodically reviewing risk-based sites.

• P_f is a function of the probability of an explosives event, the P_f given an event and exposure, and the exposure of one person.

• E_f is a function of the probability of an explosives event, the P_f given an event and exposure, and the exposure of all persons within the risk-based evaluation distance.

Risk Assessment Tools

A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) tool for risk management of explosives storage and operating scenarios, and the associated exposures (related or unrelated personnel and facilities) to those scenarios, can facilitate a comparison of risks before acceptance of the risks associated with the selected scenarios.

The DDESB provides the military departments with the flexibility to assess risks using a variety of Explosive Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) tools. Selecting the right tool depends on the complexity of the task:

• Explosives Safety Siting (ESS): The DDESB-approved automated tool for standard site planning.

• Safety Assessment for Explosives Risk (SAFER): performs quantitative risk analysis to determine risk to people from a potential explosion site (PES) by conducting a sequential calculation of the probability of event, explosives effects, and personnel exposure.

• Automated Safety Assessment Protocol–Explosives (ASAP-X): A versatile Excel-based protocol (available in US, NATO, and DTRA versions) for assessing ESQD consequences.

• Field Assessment Spreadsheet Tool for Operational Munitions Risk Management in Explosive Safety Site Planning (FAST-Site): Designed for field assessments and operational risk management.

• Nomographs: Graphical representations used for quick visual assessments of safety deviations. An example can be found here. Follow Link

ASAP-X Example

Variables:

1.1 NEW 451 lbs.

Distance 1,250

Other Building (PES)

Residential Home (ES)

Personnel 6

Input

Output

References

ASAP-X, https://www.denix.osd.mil/ddes/explosive-safety-tools/

DESR 6055.09, Edition 1, Change #2 (Published November 25, 2025), https://www.denix.osd.mil/ddes/denix-files/sites/32/2022/08/DESR-6055.09-Edition1-Change-2-251208.pdf

TP-14, Approved Methods and Algorithms for Dod Risk-Based Explosives Siting, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA507495.pdf

TP-23 Assessing Explosives Safety Risks, Deviations, and Consequences, https://www.denix.osd.mil/ddes/ddesb-technical-papers/

Updated Blast Effects and Consequences Models in DDESB TP-14 Revision 5,

https://ndia.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/intexpsafety/Conway2.pdf

Figure 10. DA Form 5203 (DODIC master record) Course MM0152A.

At its core, this form serves as the definitive manual accounting ledger for ammunition management. It is designed to provide a granular history for every item in your inventory—tracking not just the rounds themselves, but also ammunition components, residue, and packaging materials.

By allowing users to record every transaction for a single item in one place, the form acts as a powerful three-in-one management tool. It eliminates the need for fragmented paperwork by consolidating three critical functions:

• DODIC Master Record: Your primary source for item identification and stock levels.

• Lot Locator Record: A precise map for tracking specific lots and their physical locations.

• Residue and Packing Component Material: A dedicated log for accounting for what remains after the mission is complete.

This integrated approach ensures that from the moment a crate is opened until the last brass casing is recovered, your documentation remains streamlined, compliant, and easy to audit.

Currently policy, Department of the Army Pamphlet 700–16 Ammunition Management, provides detailed present information. While Department of the Army Pamphlet 710–2–2, Supply Support Activity Supply System: Manual Procedures [Inactive] provides illustrations and complete instructions by column or block.

DODIC Master Record

a. Using DA Form 5203 as a Department of Defense identification code master record.

(1) Complete the bottom portion of the form before posting any transactions. Use DA Form 5203 (DoDIC Master/Lot Locater Record) as a master record for each DoDIC within a storage site. Annotate separate account codes in the remarks block with the quantity for each account.

(2) Enter transaction heading data at the top of the DoDIC master record as follows:

(a) Enter transaction data in columns A through I of the DoDIC master record. Enter one complete transaction, referred to as a DoDIC transaction, per line.

(b) Record up to 16 DoDIC transactions on each side of the DoDIC master record.

Lot Locator Record

b. Using DA Form 5203 as a lot locator record.

(1) Make entries in blocks at the bottom of the lot locator record, before posting transactions. Enter transaction heading data at the top of the lot locator record. A lot locator record is required for each combination DoDIC, NSN, and lot number. Account codes do not have to be assigned to lot numbers.

(2) Enter transaction data in columns A through I of the lot locator record. Enter one transaction, referred to as a lot number transaction, per line. Record up to 16 lot number transactions on each side of the lot locator record. If more than one lot number is involved in the transactions, post two or more lot locator records.

Residue and Packing Component Material

c. Use of DA Form 5203 as a Department of Defense identification code master record or lot locator record for residue, components, and packaging material.

(1) This form is the accounting ledger for ammunition residue, components, and packaging materiel without DoDICs or NSNs assigned. Use it to record all transactions for a single item. Keep all forms for a single item in the visible file.

(2) Complete blocks 1 through 6 at the bottom of the form before posting any transactions. Enter transaction heading data in columns A through I of the master record. Enter one complete transaction, referred to as a master record transaction, per line. Record up to 16 transactions on each side of the master record.

Inactive Policy

Department of the Army Pamphlet 710–2–2, Supply Support Activity Supply System: Manual Procedures [Inactive] provides illustrations and completion instructions by column or block.

Legend for Figure 24-2;

Completion instructions by column or block for DA Form 5203 used as

master record.

Complete blocks at the bottom portion of the form before posting any

transactions.

(1) (DODIC). Enter DODIC.

(2) (FSC/NSN). Enter Federal Supply Class/National Stock Number.

(3) (Description). Enter nomenclature and description.

(4) (Remarks). If ammunition assets are identified by account-code within a DODIC, condition code, and lot number or serial number, enter account-code in lower left corner of remarks block on DA Forms 5203 and 5204. Enter unit price per unit of issue. Enter “ACCT: AAB” in lower left corner of the ASP number is not known. Enter transaction heading data at the top of the DODIC Master Record.

(5) DODIC master/lot locator record). Draw a line through or blot out

LOT LOCATOR in the form title.

(6) (CC). Enter the condition codes on hand in the DODIC.

(7) (Balance on hand brought forward). Enter total amount of the DODIC transferred from the preceding DODIC Master Record. Make no entry when the record is established for a new DODIC.

(8) (Condition code quantity brought forward). Enter the quantities in each condition code brought forward. Make no entry when the record is established for a new DODIC. If more condition code columns are required for a given DODIC, prepare additional cards and file the cards behind the original card in the same file pocket. Make a notation in the remarks section of the top card that more than one DODIC Master Record is on file.

Legend for Figure 24-4;

Completion instructions by column or block for DA Form 5203 used as lot locator record.

Complete blocks (1) through (16) at the bottom of the form before posting any transactions.

(1) (DODIC). Enter the DODIC.

(2) (FSC/NSN). Enter the national stock number.

(3) (Description). Enter item nomenclature.

(4) (CC). Enter condition codes (pencil entry).

(5) (Lot No.). Enter the lot number.

(6) (Remarks). Enter information that applies to the DODIC. Enter a storage site identification code in this block if the SSA is controlling stock for several storage sites. When ammunition assets are identified by account-code with a DODIC, condition code, and lot number, enter the account-code in the lower left corner of remarks block.

(7) (QD Class). Enter the Quantity Distance (QD) class (UNO class) of the NSN for Zone of Interior (ZI).

(8) (COMP GO). Enter storage compatibility group is Zone of Interior

(ZI) storage methods are used.

(9) (NEW). Enter net explosive weight per round.

(10) (FS CAT). Enter field storage category for the NSN if field storage methods are used.

(11) (WGT/RD). Enter weight per round.

(12) (WGT/PK). Enter weight per unit pack.

(13) (U/PK). Enter type of pack.

(14) (CUBE). Enter cubic feet per unit pack.

(15) (U/I). Enter unit of issue.

(16) (U/Price). Enter unit price.

(17) (Record title). Draw a line through or blot out DODIC Master in the form title.

(18) (CC). Enter condition code for lot quantity that is posted in each column.

(19) (LOC). Enter the storage location. Storage location is a five position code. Do not duplicate warehouse numbers within a SAAS-4 account. For example, if two ammunition supply points (ASPs) have accounts maintained by the same SAAS-4 SSA, ensure their warehouse numbers are different. At present, the storage location is a five position code. The first three positions are numeric for warehouse designation. The fourth and fifth codes are used to identify storage locations within the warehouse. The storage point may assign the fourth and fifth codes to meet their own special requirements; however, make the fourth and fifth codes alphabetic because the automated SAAS-4 system includes plans for a sixth and seventh code.

(20) (Balance on hand brought forward). Enter the total amount of the lot transferred from the preceding lot locator record. Make no entry when the record is established for a new lot.

(21) (Location quantity brought forward). Enter the quantities in the locations brought forward. There are four columns for this. use of more than one column for the same condition code is allowed when locations are different. If more columns are required for condition code/ location code entries, prepare additional lot number records.

Legend for Figure 24-6;

Completion instructions by column or block for DA Form 5203 used for residue and packing component material.

Complete bottom portion of the form before posting any transactions.

(1) (DODIC). Enter the DODIC.

(2) (FSC/NSN). Enter the complete national stock number for the brass, component, or packing material, when available, and the word “RESIDUE.”

(3) (Description). Enter nomenclature and description.

(4) (Remarks). Enter other information that applies to the DODIC. Enter a storage site identification code in this block when the SSA is controlling stock for several storage sites.

(5) (U/I). Enter the unit of issue.

(6) (U/Price). Enter unit price per unit of issue. Complete blocks (7) through (10) at the top of the DODIC Master/Lot Locator Record.

(7) (DODIC master/lot locator record). Draw a line through or blot out LOT LOCATOR in the form title.

(8) (CC). Enter the condition codes on hand in the DODIC. See AR 725-50.

(9) (Balance on hand brought forward). Enter total amount of the DODIC transferred from the preceding DODIC Master Record. Make no entry if establishing the record for a new DODIC.

(10) (LOC). Enter location where items are stored.

Condition code quantity brought forward. Enter the quantities brought forward for each condition code. Make no entry when establishing the record for a new DODIC. If more condition code columns are required for a given DODIC, prepare additional card(s) and file behind the first card in the same file pocket. Make a notation in the remarks section of the top card that more than one DODIC Master Record is on file.

Enter transaction data in (A) through (I) of the DODIC Master

Record. Enter one completed transaction per line. Record up to 16 DODIC transactions on each side of the DODIC Master Record.

(A) (Date). Enter the Julian date of the day the posting is made.

(B) (Date/Serial). Enter the Julian date and serial number from the SSA document control number assigned to the transaction.

(C) (DODAAC). Enter the customer unit name or its DODAAC.

(D) (Trans code-gain). Enter the appropriate SAAS transaction code for gains. See appendix G.

(E) (Trans code-loss). Enter the appropriate SAAS transaction code for losses. See appendix G.

(F) (Gain quantity). Enter gain quantity from the transaction voucher.

(G) (Loss quantity). Enter loss quantity from the transaction voucher.

(H) (Balance on hand). Enter the balance on hand for the DODIC after adding the gain or subtracting the loss.

(I) (Location quantity). Enter the quantity in each storage location by

References

Department of the Army Pamphlet 700–16 Ammunition Management, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1021640

Department of the Army Pamphlet 710–2–2, Supply Support Activity Supply System: Manual Procedures [Inactive], https://www.coursehero.com/file/183077228/DA-PAM-710-2-2pdf/

Image. Composite illustration of 155 mm M107 high-explosive projectile weight-zone markings and reference data, integrating projectile photographs, marking close-ups, technical drawing excerpts, and weight-zone tables compiled from multiple source documents. Weight Zone Markings are indicated by ◙ the Unicode character U+25D9, known as the Inverse White Circle.

Introduction. While reviewing the color coding and external markings applied to munitions, I encountered several differing explanations of Weight Zone Markings, each illustrated with its own reference image. These markings identify specific weight variations within a shell type and are a critical input for accurate fire control, ballistic matching, and overall system consistency. Although I understood the general purpose of weight zones, I found that I could not interpret the markings presented in the references because the images used to explain them varied in format. This discrepancy prompted a deeper understanding of how these markings are applied in practice. As a result, this led me on a learning journey through Field Artillery ammunition—rationale behind the ammunition weight zone markings system.

Figure 1. Various weight zone illustrations.

Figure 2. Various examples of weight zone markings.

Weights. The weights of unfuzed projectiles vary from round to round, and this variation in weight will result in considerable variation in range. To help the services conveniently note these weight variations, shells are divided into weight zones. Each lot number of ammunition contains only shells of one weight zone, and more uniform ballistic results should be obtained by firing groups containing shells of the same weight zone. These weight marks are made with a prick punch and are placed in the center of squares stenciled on the projectile. The weight zones and identification marks are placed on the shell to indicate the particular weight zone for the projectile type.

Weight of Projectile. The weights of similar projectiles vary within certain zones (commonly termed square weight). The appropriate weight zone is stenciled on the projectile (expressed in so many squares). Some projectiles are also marked with the weight in pounds. In general, a heavier-than-standard projectile experiences a decrease in muzzle velocity because more of the force generated by the gases is used to overcome the initial resistance to movement. A lighter-than-standard projectile generally experiences an increase in velocity. However, when projectiles are fired with higher charges and at increased ranges, heavier-than-standard projectiles may achieve greater ranges.

Table F in the tabular firing tables lists correction factors for the effect of nonstandard square weights. Firing tables and technical gunnery procedures allow the unit to consider specific ammunition information (projectile square weight, fuze type, and propellant temperature); thus, accurate firing data are possible. Correction for a 1 square decrease or increase in projectile weight (Columns 18 and 19). This is a correction to range to compensate for a decrease or increase of 1 square in projectile weight.

Figure 3. Table F (Continued). Columns 18 through 19 list range corrections for projectile weight.

Projectile Square Weight Error. Projectile square weight allows the Fire Direction Computers to correct projectile weights on the gun line that deviate from standard. Errors in projectile square weight cause range errors for all howitzers from the fire direction perspective. Errors may also exist on an individual howitzer due to poor ammunition reporting procedures or because the howitzer fires the wrong projectile lot. The following diagram shows the importance of accurate projectile weight. The example below describes a situation in which the munitions were not verified, the automated system contained a high explosive 3 Square, but the ammunition on the gun line was 5 Square.

Figure 4. Projectile Square Weight Error.

Engineering Drawings. These drawings communicate the complete technical explanation of a component through a standardized combination of views, notes, sections, and tables, as illustrated by this 155 mm high-explosive projectile assembly drawing. The primary orthographic and sectional views show the external geometry and internal features, including the projectile body, liner, supplementary charge, fuze cavity, and threaded interfaces, with cross-sections used to depict concealed components and assembly relationships clearly. Dimensional information is controlled through explicit linear dimensions, tolerances, and thread designations, ensuring interchangeability and manufacturability. Administrative sections such as the title block, revision status, approval signatures, distribution statement, and general notes establish configuration control and usage authority. The drawing also incorporates structured tables, including a parts or bill-of-materials table (listing part numbers and descriptions), and a loading or marking table defining explosive composition and external identification requirements. Most notable is the weight-zone table that correlates projectile mass ranges to marking codes.

Russian Projectile Weight Classification. The usual manufacturing practice is to mark projectiles that fall within or outside the nominal weight zone. Russia and some other countries do this by using + or - symbols. Russian projectile weight classifications follow:

Figure 5. Russian projectile weight classifications.

Conclusion. My progression from a basic understanding of artillery weight zone markings to a more informed understanding of their practical and technical significance. What began as confusion caused by inconsistent reference images evolved into a clearer appreciation of how projectile weight variations directly influence range, muzzle velocity, and overall fire control accuracy. By examining how weight zones are defined, marked, and accounted for in firing tables and fire direction systems, I learned that even small errors in identifying or reporting projectile square weight can produce systematic range errors across an entire firing unit. The discussion of engineering drawings further reinforced this lesson, showing how standardized views, tables, and notes formally link projectile mass ranges to specific marking codes and ensure consistency from manufacturing through employment. Ultimately, the key lesson markings on artillery ammunition serve not just as administrative labels but also as a vital technical language. Properly understanding and verifying these markings are crucial for accurate and effective military operations.

References

Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, TC 3-09.81, 2016

https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/4BA86079-56B8-42E9-8F79-C340F08A9D39-1457034137314/tc3_09x81.pdf

Mobile Artillery Ammunition, TR 1355-155A, 1927

https://www.bulletpicker.com/pdf/TR-1355-155A.pdf

155MM M107 HE High Explosive

https://www.gd-ots.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/155mm-M107-HE_US.pdf

The Improvements of Ballistic Characteristics of Artillery Projectiles of 152 and 155 mm Calibers

https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/59123966.pdf

Projectile and Warhead Identification Guide Foreign (U), 1994

https://www.bulletpicker.com/pdf/DST-1160Z-029-94.pdf

M107 Drawing 9216352

https://www.scribd.com/document/730848969/M107-Drawing-9216352

Figure 1. Report Covers.

The additional reports of the 2000s expanded on the book Historic Context For The World War II Ordnance Department’s Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Industrial Facilities, 1939-1945.

1. Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage in the United States, 1775-1945

2. Army Ammunition Production During the Cold War (1946-1989)

The report on Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage in the United States, 1775-1945, provides a historical overview of Army ammunition storage magazines from the Revolutionary War through World War II. Its goal is to outline key themes and events that shaped their construction, modifications, and usage during both the war and the mobilization period leading up to it. The historical context traces the development of these magazines from 1775 to 1945, highlighting safety concerns that arose after the 1926 Lake Denmark explosion and the increased need for material conservation during World War II. The document also includes a Planning Level Survey that classifies all ammunition storage magazines and reviews the criteria for National Register eligibility.

While the earlier study, Historic Context for the World War II Ordnance Department’s Government Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Industrial Facilities, 1939-1945, completed for the Ft. Worth District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Kane 1995), provided background on the evolution of ammunition production plants constructed during World War II mobilization, it also included detailed studies of representative examples of ammunition plants, mechanisms for selecting operators and the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract form, and the technology for producing propellants, explosives, and munitions.

The Army Ammunition Production During the Cold War (1946-1989) project examined weapon technology development during this period, updates to ammunition production facilities, and the design of Cold War-era buildings for manufacturing new ordnance. It was completed for the United States Army Environmental Command (USAEC).

References

Army Ammunition and Explosives Storage in the United States, 1775-1945

https://www.stanley.army.mil/volume1-6/ICRMP-AppF.pdf

Army Ammunition Production During the Cold War (1946-1989)

https://aec.army.mil/Portals/115/CR_Army_Ammo_Prod_During_Cold_War_1946-1989.pdf?ver=o4qC_4pp_1VM0oYqJaRIjA%3D%3D

Twin Cities Ordnance Plant Plot Plan (Patriotic Eagle Illustration). Adapted digital illustration based on a historic U.S. Army Ordnance Department plot plan, originally Circa 1940s, New Brighton, Minnesota. Modified with American flag–themed coloration. Digital image.

The 1990s U.S. Army Materiel Command issued a series of investigation reports numbered 1 to 10. The primary report (book) is titled Historic Context For The World War II Ordnance Department’s Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Industrial Facilities, 1939-1945, authored by Kimberly Kane in 1995.

The World War II Ordnance Department’s GOCO Industrial Facilities reports are the overarching project, covering this particular historical investigation along with a broad national context. This includes detailed studies of seven former World War II-era Ordnance Department GOCO industrial facilities—now located in Badger, Indiana, Joliet, Kansas, Radford, Ravenna, and the Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plants—and photographic documentation of these sites.

In September 1993, Geo-Marine, Inc. (GMI) was contracted by the Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Worth District, to complete the national historic context, detailed historic investigations, and photographic documentation. The work was performed under Delivery Order No. 014 of Contract No. DACA63-93-D-0014.

The investigation was broadened to cover Holston Army Ammunition Plant (Holston AAP) in Kingsport, Tennessee, and Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (LCAAP) in Jackson County, Missouri. The research started in 1995.

The larger project aimed to investigate and document buildings and structures from the World War II and pre-World War II eras that are now under the jurisdiction of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). This effort supports a Legacy Resource demonstration program to aid small installations. It includes implementing mitigation actions specified in a 1993 Programmatic Agreement among AMC, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, and several State Historic Preservation Officers. These actions address the stopping of maintenance, the excess, and the disposal of specific properties. Comprehensive historic research on Ammunition Plants, similar to that conducted at other sample sites, was conducted to establish the national historic context at the state and local levels. The primary emphasis is on the facility’s influence on state and local history.

Documents are available at the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): https://discover.dtic.mil/ and can be found using accession numbers, except for the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant, where only the oral interview report is available.

Figure 1. U.S. Army Materiel Command Historic Context Series Report of Investigations.

Derived from CRS Defense Primer: Conventional Ammunition Production Industrial Base, November 18, 2022.

During World War II, the War Department created a vast network of government-owned industrial facilities to support a military force of up to seven million personnel. This expansion included numerous Load, Assemble, and Pack (LAP) sites, propellant and explosive plants, chemical manufacturing facilities, and dedicated small-arms factories. These sites were strategically classified to determine which could be actively used and which could be reactivated during a full-scale mobilization. This approach ensured the military maintained essential capabilities while preserving the flexibility and modernization needed to produce complex ammunition components and final products.

As the industrial base evolved, the military concentrated on core facilities, selected for their competitiveness, importance, and production capabilities. By 2007, this focus led to significant consolidation, closing all plants not deemed part of the core. By 2010, the ammunition industrial base was further refined to align with contemporary strategic needs. This lean, modern network illustrates the ongoing evolution of the industrial system originally built to support the efforts of World War II.

The History of the Ammunition Industrial Base traces the transformation of the munitions industry over several decades. It highlights the growth from the massive expansion during World War II in 1945 to the post-Vietnam stabilization in 1977.

To reflect the current state of this infrastructure, an updated illustration has been created showing the Defense Primer: Conventional Ammunition Production Industrial Base as of November 18, 2022. This modern view captures the ongoing evolution of the base as it balances essential capabilities with the advanced technical requirements of contemporary military operations.

Figure 1. WWII ERA GOVERNMENT OWNED AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE

Figure 2. 1977 GOVERNMENT OWNED AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE

Figure 3. 2007 GOVERNMENT OWNED AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE

Figure 4. 2010 GOVERNMENT OWNED AMMUNITION INDUSTRIAL BASE

References

History of the Ammunition Industrial Base

https://www.jmc.army.mil/Docs/History/History_of_the_Ammunition_Industrial.pdf

Defense Primer: Conventional Ammunition Production Industrial Base

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12251

Typical ECM Components.UFC 4-420-01.

What is the cost to build that magazine? A common question I receive about ammunition magazines. Typically, the inquiry is directed to Engineering, and I don’t hear about it again until I see the final total. Earth-Covered Magazine (ECM) or a traditional Ammunition Storage Facility isn’t as straightforward as checking Zillow. During research on a different topic, I learned that estimating costs involves specialized guidelines, specific unit costs, and necessary geographic adjustments. For those engaged in military construction (MILCON) planning, the authoritative U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) sources include the following:

Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-701-01, DoD Facilities Pricing Guide,

UFC 3-730-0, Programming Cost Estimates for Military Construction,

UFC 3-740-05, Construction Cost Estimating

PAX Newsletter 3.2.2: Army Facility Unit Costs

While an attempt to summarize this complex process is not possible in its entirety, as it involves layers of engineering requirements, safety protocols, and federal acquisition regulations, there are a few tables within these policies that provide some valuable information for high-level planning for munitions storage.

Facility Unit Cost. The table provides facility unit costs for various DoD facility types; these are average unit costs for new construction based on no less than three project awards per building type.

Unit Costs for Models. Unit costs and related factors are associated with Facility Analysis Categories represented by a 4-digit code in the DoD Real Property Classification System (RPCS), which is a hierarchical scheme of real property types and functions that serves as the framework for identifying, categorizing, and modeling the DoD’s inventory of land and facilities. FACs are common across the department and suitable for department-wide applications. For each FAC, Table 3 identifies the associated unit cost to be used in DoD facilities cost models and metrics.

Comparable service category codes (CATCODEs). Tri-Service CATCODEs Cross-walk table groups like service CATCODEs to a common Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Facility Analysis Category (FAC), ensuring that whether you are in the Army, Navy, or Air Force, you are using a unified pricing standard for similar structures

Tri-Service CatCode - FAC crosswalk

Table 2: Facility Unit Costs for Military Construction

Table 3: Unit Costs for DoD Facility Cost Models (FY2025)

Estimating the cost of Earth-Covered Magazines (ECMs) or traditional ammunition storage facilities is a specialized process governed by Department of Defense (DoD) regulations. Several authoritative sources and specific data tables provide the framework for these programming cost estimates. For more details, visit wbdg.org.

Postscript

Appendix C, UFC 3-730-0, Programming Cost Estimates for Military Construction, presents a detailed breakdown of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) systems costs as a percentage of the total facility cost for a High Explosive Magazine. This facility type allocates a substantial portion of its budget to structural integrity and enclosure, with Foundation (23.5%), Superstructure (27%), and Exterior Enclosure (34.19%) as the main cost categories. In comparison, interior construction and finishes are minimal (0.03% and 0.19%, respectively). Essential systems, such as Electrical (9.22%) and HVAC (0.87%), account for a smaller share of the costs.

Appendix C Ratio of WBS [Work Breakdown Structure] Systems Cost to Facility Cost by Facility Type

Abberivated Facility Unit Costs for Military Construction (Notional)

ECM, Concrete Oval-Arch: $1,742,241

4221. Ammunition Storage Installation. 25’-0” Wide x length 80’.

Notes:

1. Formula to Estimate Facility Adjusted Guidance Unit Cost, UFC 3-730-01

$A = $GUC × S × ACF × CE × TU × DC × HR × SS

Where:

$A = adjusted guidance unit cost

$GUC = guidance unit cost

S = size factor

ACF = area cost factor

CE = cost escalation

TU = technological updating factor

DC = design contingency

HR = historical requirement factor

SS = site sensitivity factor

2. Use size factors in Table 2-1, UFC 3-730-01, when the facility gross area differs from a similar type facility’s reference size. Example: >3.05, 0.9200

3. See Table 4-1 of UFC 3-701-01 for factors to adjust estimated costs to specific geographical areas. Example: Guantanamo Bay. Cuba

4. Table 4-2 of UFC 3-701-01 is updated annually and provides data to use to project cost escalation due to inflationary factors affecting construction costs. Example: Mid Point for OCT 26.

5. Programming the technical complexity of the project for which the cost estimate is being prepared. The level of technical complexity must be a prerequisite for determining the magnitude of the DC. DC is listed in Table 2-5, UFC 3-730-01. Example: Low, Site adapted repetitive standard design project involving routine technology.

6. Determine the estimated facility cost by multiplying the size of the facility being programmed by the adjusted unit cost.

Reference.

UFC 3-701-01 DoD Facilities Pricing Guide, with Change 7. https://www.wbdg.org/dod/ufc/ufc-3-701-01

North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles. CSIS Missile Defense Project.

https://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2021_NorthKorean_MissileMap_Web-scaled.jpg

An infographic is a powerful visual tool that presents complex data, knowledge, or information in a clear, concise format. By skillfully combining text with appealing visual elements—such as charts, diagrams, icons, and illustrations—an infographic helps people absorb visual information faster than just reading text. Its main goal is to simplify content, making it immediately more accessible to a broad audience. That’s why they are often used in business communication.

Various types of munitions exist, but some familiar examples come to mind when viewing visual materials. I have gathered some well-known open, unclassified resources and included their links below, allowing you to explore weapon systems. Elements—such as types, models, payloads, and general ranges—help you create your own munitions infographics.

Do you have an infographic, diagram, or chart you want to share? Remember Operational Security (OPSEC).

Figure 1. Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Munitions Overview

Link: https://www.twz.com/ukraine-getting-atacms-cluster-variant-would-be-a-big-problem-for-russia

Figure 2. Army Tactical Missile System Family of Munitions

Link: https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/ukraine_wont_be_running_short_of_atacms_production_rates_and_stock_estimates-10384.html

Figure 3. PAC-3 MSE Interceptor

Link: https://www.twz.com/patriot-pac-3-hit-to-kill-interceptors-also-pack-a-little-known-explosive-warhead

Figure 4. Patriot launcher types and possible load configurations.

Link: https://www.twz.com/we-now-know-the-types-of-patriot-missiles-being-used-in-ukraine

Figure 5. Family of Hellfire Munitions.

Link: https://theaviationist.com/2025/02/09/u-s-approves-massive-7-billion-arms-sale-to-israel/

Vilhelm Bjerknes, circa 1920

Nearly two decades ago, I was a young staff sergeant going through the Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course for our military occupational specialty, and the topic of earth-covered magazines was introduced. It was a fascinating lecture that covered a wide range of features, requirements, and utilization. At the end, we were given the opportunity to ask questions. Well, of course, I had many, and most were answered very well. That was until I got to the naming conventions for the ECM designs. While all fall within three basic structural hardness classifications, "7-Bar", "3-Bar" and "Undefined.” Why are the numbers 7 and 3 used? Seems very specific, I pondered. The answer received was not the most accurate, and while it seems plausible. I was always wary of the answer, as it was related to the number of rebars used in the construction of the magazines.

Well, thanks to the commercial industrial base, I now at least have the answer.

Earth Covered Magazines

ECM designs fall within three basic structural hardness classifications; "7-Bar", "3-Bar" and "Undefined" depending upon the relative ability to resist blast loadings. As listed below from the Whole Building Design Guide.

1. "7-Bar" (Standard) Designs A 7-Bar ECM provides the highest level of blast resistance and allows the use of the least restrictive siting separation distances. These designs may store up to 500,000 pounds NEW of hazard division 1.1, however some approved designs are based upon a lower storage capacity.

2. "3-Bar" Designs The headwall and doors of a 3-Bar ECM provides a lower level of blast resistance than a 7-Bar ECM resulting in more restrictive siting separation distances. A 3-Bar ECM may store up to 500,000 pounds NEW of hazard division 1.1, however some approved designs are based upon a lower storage capacity.

3. "Undefined" (Nonstandard) Designs An Undefined ECM provides the lowest level of blast resistance and requires the greatest siting separation distances. An Undefined ECM may store up to 500,000 pounds NEW of hazard division 1.1, however many of the designs are based upon a lower storage capacity.

The term ‘Bar’ was introduced by Vilhelm Bjerknes, a Norwegian meteorologist best known for founding the modern practice of weather forecasting. The bar is used as a unit of pressure. It is defined as roughly the atmospheric pressure on Earth at an altitude of 111 meters (365 feet) at 15 °C (59°F). It is often used to measure pressure in mechanical engineering, automobiles, and monitoring tire pressures—and yes, Earth Covered Magazines.

Below you can see the chart that converts Bar, Pascal (Pa), Kilopascal (kPa), and the more familiar Pounds per Square Inch (psi).

A "7-Bar" equals 101.53 psi, while "3-Bar" equals 43.51 psi of blast resistance. Although we may never understand why Bar was chosen instead of other pressure units, one fact remains: there is a need for standard terminology. As Vilhelm Bjerknes explained in his account of the origin of the unit, the “bar,” which follows.

“When fourteen years ago I began to occupy myself with problems concerning the dynamics of the atmosphere and the sea. I encountered many difficulties of terminology...I therefore coined the terms “bar,” “decibars,” “centibars”, and “millibars” as units of pressure…In place, then, of the cumbrous expressions which prevailed formerly.”

I believe Vilhelm Friman Koren Bjerknes would be pleased that his system establishes a universal standard in Earth Covered Magazines.

References

Ammunition & Explosive Magazines, https://www.wbdg.org/building-types/ammunition-explosive-magazines

Pressure Conversion Table | Bar, Pa, Kpa & Psi, https://constructandcommission.com/pressure-conversion-table-bar-psi-kpa/

"Nomenclature of the unit of absolute pressure, Charles F. Marvin, 1918" (PDF). noaa.gov. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170429123958/https://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue/mwr/046/mwr-046-02-0073.pdf

They are comprised of various components, including frames (which indicate standard identity like friendly, hostile, or neutral), main icons (representing the primary function), modifiers, and amplifiers, all combined with specific colors and lettering to convey detailed operational data.

This system is crucial for effective planning, wargaming, and overall command and control, ensuring that all members of the profession of arms can understand and interpret tactical situations with precision and efficiency.

Main Function Symbols for Units (Class V)

Support Area

Point Control Measure

Reference

FM_1-02.2, Military Symbols, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1030416

(Photo: Richard Raines)

The Automated Ammunition Inspection System (AAIS), recently displayed, has been designed, developed, and tested by Cybernet.

The Cybernet prototype features a small-caliber ammunition inspection capability and is utilized in the field by Modular Ammunition Companies to perform inspections on loose, field-retrieved small-caliber ammunition. It is packaged in a small modular container for transport and can be easily set up.

The design is based on the existing Automated Tactical Ammunition Classification System (ATACS) and the Spent Brass Sorter (SBS) that is currently fielded at 12 military installations.

Figure 1. Automated Tactical Ammunition Classification System.

References

Ammo Classification System

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/1256/ammo-classification-system

Automated Ammunition Inspection System

https://www.cybernet.com/programs/automated-ammunition-inspection-system/

Automated Ammunition Inspection System, LinkedIn Post

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/richard-raines-32386a227_ammunition-automation-logistics-activity-7329213749490311168-dfdD?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAABAdQ6UBUqudJqdTJoHs_Jdb06A-93EYgE0

Figure 1. Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, Integrated Approach Informs Decision Makers.

Munitions, like most items, have data that can be harnessed for decision-making. Two of the most powerful data analytics platforms are Advana and Vantage. Data sources such as the Total Ammunition Management Information System (TAMIS) and the Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) can and are used. Data analytics platforms have been able to harness these and other data sources. However, this now requires a bit of creativity, education, and training throughout the force to utilize data for informed munitions sustainment capability. Ensuring that the line between disorder and order, where logistics lies, can be analyzed, visualized, and shared through interactive dashboards and reports. The integration of Microsoft 365 and Power BI services, specifically designed for U.S. government customers, offers commanders a robust suite of tools designed to enhance data-driven decision-making and operational capabilities significantly.

ADVANA

Advancing Analytics (ADVANA) is the DoD multi-domain, enterprise-wide data, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI) platform that provides military and civilian decision makers, analysts, and builders at all levels with unprecedented access to authoritative enterprise data and structured analytics in a scalable, reliable, and secure environment.

Website: https://advana.data.mil/ (CAC Required)

Army Vantage

Army Vantage is an enterprise data analytics platform enabling Army users at every echelon and across classification levels to view comprehensive Army-wide data, analyze trends, and make data-driven decisions.

The Army Data Platform is based on Palantir’s Foundry software and includes tools such as Ontology, Workshop, and Contour, to name a few.

Website: https://vantage.army.mil (CAC Required)

Conclusion

Effectively managing munitions in large-scale combat operations centers on rapidly transforming data from sources like TAMIS and SAAS into actionable decisions, a capability significantly enhanced by powerful analytics platforms such as the DoD's Advana and the Army's Vantage. These platforms, complemented by visualization and collaboration tools like Microsoft’s Power BI, enable comprehensive analysis and sharing of logistics data. However, realizing the full potential of these technological advancements requires education and training, empowering soldiers to leverage data for improved decision-making in combat operations.

References

1-Sustainment Enterprise Analytics Modernization with Microsoft BI

https://www.army.mil/article/284095/sustainment_enterprise_analytics_modernization_with_microsoft_bi

Advana 101 Briefing Deck

https://www.acq.osd.mil/asda/dpc/ce/p2p/docs/training-presentations/2024/p2p%202024%20-%20procurement%20analytics%20data%20in%20advana%20part%20i.pdf

ARMY VANTAGE

https://www.eis.army.mil/sites/default/files/2020-12/PEO%20VANTAGE_EC_Fact%20Sheet_FINAL.pdf

Enterprise Data Management Data Sharing Team

https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/DLMS/Summit/Day1/10.%20DLA%20J6D%20Data%20Sharing%20(Carter).pdf

Munitions Sustainment | Data-Informed Munitions Allows Leaders to Make Better Choices

https://www.army.mil/article/270896/munitions_sustainment_data_informed_munitions_allows_leaders_to_make_better_choices

Palantir Foundry 101

https://unit8.com/resources/palantir-foundry-101-2/

Palantir Expands Army Vantage Partnership with $618.9M Contract

https://investors.palantir.com/news-details/2024/Palantir-Expands-Army-Vantage-Partnership-with-618.9M-Contract/

Vantage Quick Start Guide

https://www.financialfrontline.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/VantageQuickStart_PrintableDeskReference_Aug2022.pdf

(U.S. Army National Guard photo by Capt. Leanne Demboski) (Photo Credit: Capt. Leanne Demboski)

The US Army has published images of Soldiers conducting a live fire of first-person view (FPV) drones at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Feb. 17-20, 2025.

For the first time, FPV drones were combined with live munitions in a series of live fire flights, all within range safety standards. The team built the FPV drones and 3D-printed some components on site at Balli Airfield, Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany, in the weeks leading up to the exercise.

Project Shiv, as it was called, was the first time the U.S. Army had flown an armed FPV, one-way attack drone into targets on a range in a host nation. The first FPV flight successfully employed its munition on the planned target, and the teams could review the flight recording.

U.S. Soldiers prepare to fly first person view drones from a humvee at a range at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Feb. 18, 2025. U.S. Soldiers with the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard in support of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine mission, 7th Army Training Command and 173rd Airborne Brigade collaborated with U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command to lead an innovative unmanned aircraft system project at GTA, Feb. 17-20, 2025. Coined “Project Shiv”, the innovative exercise involved using FPV drones assembled at Balli Airfield in conjunction with development munitions created by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) Armaments Center. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Israel Fernandez) (Photo Credit: Spc. Israel Fernandez)

Soldiers live fire FPV drones in Germany

https://www.army.mil/article/283937/soldiers_live_fire_fpv_drones_in_germany

Good afternoon, everyone. Before I begin, the views presented are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of DoD or its components. Welcome to the closing session of Loitering Munitions USA.

Today, I'd like to discuss the critical topic of modernizing drone munitions. Drones, or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), are no longer a futuristic concept; they are a vital and evolving component of modern combat operations. Their effectiveness hinges not only on the platform itself, but crucially on the munitions they carry. We must ensure these systems are equipped with the right tools to achieve mission success.

A key driver in the drone modernization effort is the Replicator Initiative. This program represents a paradigm shift, focusing on accelerated development and delivery of critical capabilities with operational impact. It's about getting drone technology into the hands of the warfighter rapidly and at scale. Specifically, Replicator aims to deliver all-domain attritable autonomous systems, which must include advanced drone munitions. A needed push to not just build drones, but to equip them with smart, adaptable, and cost-effective weaponry.

The landscape of drone operations is diverse and varied. We have drones designed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the battlefield. Others are purpose-built for direct action, requiring a different suite of munitions. The challenge lies in matching the right munition to the specific drone and its intended mission. A small, tactical drone might require lightweight, precision-dropped munitions, while a larger, more strategic platform could utilize a heavier, longer-range weapon. This tailored approach is crucial for maximizing effectiveness and minimizing unintended consequences.

Munitions Modernization can be pursued through a multi-pronged approach. One approach is to adapt existing munitions for drone deployment. This leverages proven technology; however, the integration process needs to be streamlined. Another area of exploration is 3D printing. This offers the potential to create custom munition bodies and components, allowing for rapid prototyping and tailoring to specific drone platforms. Beyond adapting existing weapons, the Army must invest in developing entirely new, drone-specific munitions. These could include munitions for drone dropping, firing, and loitering operations, as well as other innovative solutions designed to leverage the unique capabilities of small unmanned systems.

Now, as we look to transform existing capabilities with the advent of these new systems, Army senior leaders will insist on a thorough analysis of the institution’s preparedness. This analysis must fully integrate and capitalize on new systems, utilizing the DOTMLPF-P framework – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy. This systematic approach will compel the institutional army to analyze how it can innovatively integrate new systems to foster definitive shifts in the character of war. We cannot simply introduce new technology without considering the broader implications for how we fight, train, and sustain our forces.

This modernization effort is far more than just developing new hardware; it demands a holistic approach mirroring the Army's broader modernization strategy. It requires sustained investment in research and development to push the boundaries of munitions technology, aligning with other common munitions programs and other efforts focused on increased lethality, range, and precision. We must also prioritize training our personnel on the proper employment and maintenance of these advanced systems, integrating them into realistic training scenarios and leveraging simulations to maximize proficiency. This includes not only the operators themselves, but also the maintainers and support personnel who ensure these systems are ready for combat. Crucially, we need to collaborate closely with our partners, both within and outside the Department of Defense (DoD), including organizations such as the Joint Program Executive Office for Armaments & Ammunition (JPEO A&A) and Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM), and Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) as well as with industry partners, to ensure interoperability and accelerate the development cycle. A collaborative ecosystem, fostering open communication and shared goals, is crucial for keeping up with battlefield innovation and ensuring drone munitions remain a decisive advantage in modern warfare.

By investing in this critical area and adhering to rigorous analysis, we can ensure that our drones are equipped with the best munitions for the future battlefield.

Slide 1

Now, I would like to direct your attention to the slide quickly. This slide provides a general overview of the key standards that are required. These are requirements for drone munitions, including loitering, drone-dropping, and drone-firing operations. Standards are necessary to ensure safety, accuracy, and effectiveness without compromising the ability to give warfighters a competitive edge in the fight, allowing them to be creative and innovative on the battlefield.

We can go from this to Standardization.

Slide 2

Showcased here in the International Defence Exhibition & Conference - IDEX 2025 highlighting new defense technologies, with Ukraine Export Company leading the way in standardized drone munitions.

Showing us that it can be done.

Thank you for your attention. And I would be pleased to take any questions.

Loitering Munitions USA

April 7 - April 8, 2025

USA

The Leading Forum for Military Education and Training on Loitering Munitions Programs

https://www.smgconferences.com/defence/northamerica/conference/loitering-munitions-usa

The Mexican news company Adiscusión Diario reported a recent seizure of explosives in the town of El Camaron, located in the Escuinapa Municipality in the southern part of the Mexican state of Sinaloa. The Mexican Army conducted the safe destruction of what the paper calls improvised explosive devices. We can clearly see that they have all the characteristics of Drone-Dropped Munitions. Signaling that even the Mexican Cartels have started to use drone munitions.

Also, X user Pernicious Propaganda @natsecboogie describes the munitions as Short metallic body w/ four stabilizer fins welded onto the body, hook for deployment, screw on nose cap, ~31.7 cm in length & irregularities across the munitions. Stating that it was the first time seeing the contents of one of the drone drop munitions used by cartels. With, X user Trevor Ball @Easybakeovensz identifying the internal explosives as commercial ANFO.

Mexican cartels are increasingly utilizing weaponized drones to conduct attacks, deploying them to drop explosives on rival gangs and law enforcement. The adaptation of commercially available drones for munitions delivery by cartels presents a growing security challenge.

References

24 improvised explosive devices seized in Escuinapa destroyed, https://www.adiscusion.com/Noticia.aspx?q=-Destruyen-24-artefactos-explosivos-improvisados--asegurados-en-Escuinapa-2ae7

Adiscusión Diario @adiscusion, https://x.com/adiscusion/status/1903985936750518504

Trevor Ball @Easybakeovensz, https://x.com/Easybakeovensz/status/1904202324811170145

Pernicious Propaganda @natsecboogie, https://x.com/natsecboogie/status/1903992971474735209